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Is My Foreign Yours?  The Concept of Foreignness in the Comparative 
Regulation of Political Finance 
 
This paper reflects on an ongoing policy debate over the regulation of ‘foreign’ political influence, including 
via donations to parties or lobby groups.  The debate assumes a paradigm of foreignness, pivoting around 
money from offshore interests with no direct interest in the state in question.  That paradigm masks deeper 
questions for regulation about the ‘why’ of regulation, questions that can only be answered by also 
considering the ‘whom’:  who is foreign?  Is foreignness a factor of where the money was housed; or the 
status of the entity?  What of permanent residents, who may or may not have voting rights but are clearly 
part of the political community?  Conversely, what of citizens abroad? 
This paper puts the debate in context in two stages.  First it analyses the idea of ‘foreignness’ as a general 
concept linked to notions of otherness and xenophobia. The notion is then explored within its political and 
legal context. In doing so three underlying conceptions of foreignness are identified: jurisdiction, political 
community (thin or thick), and material interconnectedness (which assumes a more internationalist stance).  
These theoretical conceptions are contrasted with Tham’s bottom up typology, which identified three 
regulatory ‘rationales’ or categories of foreignness within political finance law: overseas resources, foreign 
governments and foreigner status (whether individual or organisational).   
Then the paper compares the approach of five anglophone liberal democracies to the regulation of ‘foreign’ 
political finance.  Ultimately, it is shown that existing regulation embraces a variety of conceptions of 
foreignness – only the old laissez-faire approach, in which there would be few barriers to foreign political 
money, has been eschewed.  Revealingly, although the notion of ‘foreign’ should be nested and symmetric, 
it rarely is applied to influence between regions in federal systems, nor to the activities of local corporations 
abroad. 
 
There is an ongoing policy debate, happening simultaneously in many countries, over the 
regulation of ‘foreign’ political influence, including via donations to parties or lobby groups.  Much 
of the debate has centred on practicalities (eg of enforcement) or breadth (eg whether the law 
should catch only political parties, or election campaign accounts, or lobby groups all-year-round).   
But there is a deeper question:  what is ‘foreign’? 
Whilst the question of foreign influence on domestic policy and politics is of re-emerging 
significance, cross-border political activity is nothing new.  Interest in the increasingly complexity 
of its regulation was evidenced in the appearance of a hefty international handbook as early as 
2005.1 For an example of the question in action, one only has to look at the scandal and judicial 
investigation that has enveloped former French President Nicholas Sarkozy. Sarkozy is alleged to 
have taken Libyan funds to help finance his campaigning in the late 2000s.2   
Some of this interest reflects a recrudescence of often conflicting nationalisms, in the past several 
years. High profile accusations and inquiries into offshore activity aimed at domestic politics 
                                                             
1  Thomas D Grant (ed), Lobbying, Government Relations and Campaign Finance Worldwide (Oceana Publications 2005).  An 
updated, if skeletal, account of relevant laws can also be found through International IDEA, especially its online 
‘Political Finance Database’ 
2 Anne-ael Durand et al, ‘Comprendre l’affaire Sarkozy et la Libye en 2007’, Le Monde online, 18/11/2016.  Sarkozy 
claims the investigation is politicised:  Anon,  ‘Financement libyen: Nicolas Sarkozy dénounce une “manipulation 
d’une ampleur inédite”’, Le Monde online, 25/3/2018 
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include US and western European inquiries into alleged Russian cyber-involvement and offshore 
technological and social-media assistance in both national election campaigns and high-profile 
referendums such as on Brexit.  Closer to this author’s home, and to the immediate topic, Australia 
has been engaged in a political and legal debate about Chinese influence, including the question of 
political donations from Chinese business people and entities. China, for its part, has publicly 
lamenting ‘irresponsible’ Australian government comments which ‘pander[ed]’ to ‘fabricated’ 
media reports that evinced a ‘Cold War mentality’.  It asserted that it ‘has no intention to interfere 
in Australia's internal affairs or exert influence on its political process through political 
donations’.3 
International political activity can take a plethora of forms:  from espionage-style influence, 
through lobbying and funding of parties, and on to online issue and electoral advocacy.  It can 
involve offshore corporate, private and governmental actors – categories that may overlap, 
especially in countries where oligarchies flourish or where governments are heavily involved in 
business activities.  
Electoral activity is obviously particularly sensitive to questions of ‘foreign’ involvement, given it 
represents the confluence of citizen choice and the legitimation of governing elites within a nation-
state.  Our focus here will be on one key aspect of that activity:  political finance and in particular 
the source of contributions to political parties and candidates. 
Some 116 out of 171 countries surveyed by International IDEA have some prohibition on 
donations from foreign interests to local political parties.4  Not all involve blanket prohibitions:  
some focus only on foreign governments or unions.  Nor is the trajectory of regulation all one 
way:  India for instance recently relaxed its 1976 ban on donations from foreign corporations.5 
The money-in-politics question is not, however, restricted to the paradigm of party or candidate 
funding.  There is also the older question of ingratiation and bribery of politicians or officials.   A 
paradigm example is the famous, old, but little litigated ‘emoluments’ clause in the US Constitution, 
designed to restrict that country’s president from being the subject of gifts from foreign 
governments.   
 
‘Foreignness’ in Political and Legal Context 
 
In public consciousness, the idea of foreignness represents a simple legal duality.  If X is foreign 
to Y, then Y is foreign to X.   The underlying concept however is not so simple to pin down. The 
concept is intertwined, at least in sociological discourse, with the phenomena described as 
‘xenophobia’.  As Wicker points out in the International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences, 
that term is ‘well established’ even though it has ‘weak theoretical foundation’.   
Xenophobia may connote a natural wariness of strangers prior to getting to know or understand 
                                                             
3 Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Australia, ‘Remarks of Spokesperson of Chinese Embassy in Australia’, 
6/12/2017, <http://au.china-embassy.org/eng/sgjs/sghd/t1516965.htm> and ‘Foreign Ministry Spokesperson 
Geng Shuang’s Comments on Australian Leader’s Remarks’, 8/12/2017, <http://au.china-
embassy.org/eng/sgjs/sghd/t1518005.htm> (both accessed 3/4/2018). 
4 Sourced from International IDEA, above n 1, accessed 5/4/2018.  Such regulation is almost universal in Asia (92% 
of 34 countries surveyed). 
5 Asha Gupta, ‘Party Funding in India’, ch 22 in Jonathan Mendilow and Eric Phélippeau, Handbook of Political Party 
Funding (Edward Elgar, 2018) 411 at 414. 
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them, or it can connote an instinctive aversion or dislike.  Fear (of the unknown) or loathing (of 
difference).6  Beneath either connotation is a more basic distinction, between the self and the other. 
Both connotations have played a role in public and political debates about restraining foreign 
political activity.  The wariness aspect has been evident in Australia in recent years.  In 2004, a 
British Lord and Conservative political figure gave $1m in a single donation to the governing 
Australian Liberal Party.7  This remarkable, if lawful, donation did not generate scandal.  At most, 
objections cited egalitarian concerns (the unfairness of large or class-motivated donations), not the 
donor’s nationality.  On the contrary, defenders of the largesse saw the donation as a form of 
sympatico assistance between ideologically and culturally aligned parties in the Westminster 
tradition, rather than an attempt to buy favour or influence from a member of the establishment 
of a foreign country.   
Yet, as we noted in the introduction, recent attention on clusters of donations from business 
people or entities from Chinese backgrounds has been framed in terms of unruly offshore 
commercial interests and, worse, insidious connections to the regime in Beijing.   British interest 
in Australian politics apparently arouse less fear than Chinese.  Partly because British influence has 
been part of the historical memory and partly because China is a relatively new player and its 
politics seems opaque to Australians. Whilst the debate has been driven by the rise of China, geo-
political shifts are not uncommon and not all lead to such domestic unease. 
Partly also, then, the debate has revealed a cruder xenophobia, an instinctive aversion that has long 
roots.  These roots date to the flux of Chinese immigrants in the second half of the 19th century, 
which culminated in restrictive measures such as the Chinese Acts of 1861-1890 (Victoria) and 
ultimately a ‘White Australia’ immigration policy that survived until the late 1960s.   
The confluence of these factors however is complex. It is no coincidence that the debate 
manifested at a time of renewed nationalism in the West. Although not as obvious in Australian 
politics as in say the UK ‘Brexit’ referendum or in the US Trump election, this nationalism was 
emblemised in the revival of the One Nation Party in 2016, a party whose roots lay in explicit anti-
Asian sentiment in the late 1990s.  China in one sense then is just the latest manifestation of a ‘near 
northern’ threat to the island-mindset of Australia (a la Japan in the 1930s-40s, or Indonesia in the 
1970s-90s).   
But we should not over-simplify.  19th century resentment was born out of superiority:  out of 
crude racialism and a belief that impoverished immigrants would undercut white labour rates. 
Concerns over a tide of people have been substituted in contemporary times by concerns driven 
over a sense of inferiority:  financial inferiority in the face of a tide of money with the capacity to 
erode national sovereignty.  Commercialism of course has a contractual element, and inward 
investment is welcome. But money is more fluid than people, and so harder to police. 
In political philosophy, too, a concept like ‘foreignness’ is not easy to pin down.  Even in biology 
or psychology, the seemingly simple division between organism and environment or self and other 
(or to put it another way, between internal and external or welcome and unwelcome) is blurry.  
Just consider the interdependence of cellular and bacterial life or the personal and the social.  If as 
                                                             
6 ‘Xenophobia’, in Neil Smelser and Paul Baltes (general eds), International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences 
(Elsevier, 2001) 16649. 
7 Lord Michael Ashcroft:  ‘British Lord Made $1m Donation to Libs’, smh.com.au, 1/2/2006. 
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the poet Donne put it, ‘no man is an island’, then how much moreso is it hard to define the essence 
let alone periphery of a political entity? 
However much the political will to regulate ‘foreign’ political finance has been marked by wariness 
or even resentment of those labelled ‘outsiders’, the legal question of what is foreign cannot be 
reduced to or framed in such terms.  This is for two reasons:  one to do with liberal legalism, the 
other to do with the context of what is being regulated.  First and most obviously, liberal legalism 
eschews the language of xenophobia.  This is not just a mask;8 it has aspirational value in any 
system built formally on non-discriminatory concepts of citizenship or the colour-blind market 
ethos of trade.  For instance, it may be easier for tariffs to gain traction in a time of heightened 
xenophobia - witness President Trump’s 2018 steel and aluminium tariffs.  But even Trump had 
to announce multilateral tariffs then seek to justify exceptions for allies on rational economic or 
national security grounds. 
Second, and more importantly, any framing of the concept of ‘foreign’ in law has to adapt to the 
context of what is being regulated.  Laws about foreign involvement in governmental and political 
activities are different from, say, laws about immigration or trade.  An example from the Australian 
Constitution may suffice.  In a rule laid down in 1901, dual citizens of ‘foreign powers’ remain 
excluded from being elected to or serving in the Australian Parliament.  In the original intention 
of its framers, the UK and Australia’s fellow ‘dominions’ such as Canada and New Zealand were 
not caught by that rule.  But by the late 1990s the Australian High Court ruled that the UK had 
become ‘foreign’.9   
The ruling did not draw on evidence of any cooling in fondness between the countries, or any 
sense of cultural alienation.  Rather it was justified by cool facts of governmentality.  Australia had 
become separated from the UK in a political sense, through a series of tectonic drifts. Most 
obvious were mid-twentieth century conventions about the autonomy of its foreign policy and a 
severing, by the 1980s, of any lingering avenues through which UK judges or MPs might 
theoretically make law affecting Australia.  A few eyebrows were raised at the ruling, given the two 
countries retained a shared head of state.  But the test of ‘foreignness’ is not purely symbolic. 
Sharing a practically powerless constitutional monarchy was an ultimate sign of once close 
relationship, but too formal to be a barrier to a finding that the UK had evolved from being 
Australia’s ‘mother country’ to being a ‘foreign power’. 
Us and Them: ‘Foreignness’ Defined by Jurisdiction, Political Community or Material Inter-connectedness 
Still, the existence of porous boundaries does not negate the search for dividing lines that might 
capture various conceptions of ‘foreignness’.  Here I suggest there are three differing conceptions. 
The state in a jurisdictional sense presents the simplest conception. A second, much subtler idea 
is that of distinct political community.  A third conception, which cuts across the other two is an 
idea of material inter-connectedness.   
The idea of local versus foreign jurisdiction is most obviously a territorial idea:  geographical 
jurisdiction.  That which is offshore and beyond the borders of the state is foreign.  But it can also 
encompass a more formal notion of legal jurisdiction, especially in relation to entities as opposed 
                                                             
8 As it was say at the founding of the Australian Commonwealth.  Then, an immigration policy explicitly described as 
‘White Australia’ was achieved through administrative discretion rather than written explicitly into the Immigration 
Restriction Act of 1901, largely to appease British concerns about Japanese sensibilities:   
9 Sue v Hill (1999) 199 CLR 462. 
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to people or tangible objects.  In particular, the place of registration of artificial entities such as 
incorporated bodies.10  
As Elizabeth Frazer argued, the idea of ‘community’ can seem too amorphous to be analytically 
useful.11  Still, Frazer teases out a thick and thin conception of political community.  The thicker 
one stresses genuine groupness in the form of shared or inherited values and identity. The thinner 
conception is based on the fact of a ‘common subjection to some set of governing institutions and 
structures’.12  On its face it is more formal than the thick conception, but it is not insubstantive.  
Neither conception, as we shall see, is coextensive with the legal notion of citizenship as a 
prerequisite to political rights.  Thus an expatriate citizens may retain a sense of shared values and 
identity despite years abroad and thus be part of the thicker conception. For their part, regardless 
of their formal status, permanent residents are subject, everyday, to the ‘governing institutions and 
structures’ that bind the thinner conception of political community.  
It is worth observing that, in either thick or thin form, the concept of political community need 
not centre on national identity.  This is most obvious in federations, especially those with great 
regional diversity.13  Yes, as we will note at the end of this paper, when it comes to regulating 
political finance the former idea dominates.  That is, ‘foreign’ money or influence is defined as that 
coming from outside a nationalist conception of political community, leaving state or regional 
political communities to interfere with and influence each other. 
Besides the relatively simple jurisdictional definition, and besides more substantive notions of 
political community, there is a rival if looser concept societies as materially interconnected.  This 
is often caricatured as a liberal capitalist view of the world: ‘community’ through the 
interrelatedness of trade in goods and services and movement of people and capital.  But it may 
also capture left-wing internationalism. That kind of internationalism once followed a socialist 
conception, of humanity responding to but rooted in a substructure of economic forces.  Today it 
is more likely to assume an environmentalism which stresses a different kind of materialist 
substructure, namely nature as a borderless pre-requisite for all life.   
Normatively, the capitalist and socialist approaches are worlds apart. One legitimates the idea of 
capital and for-profit corporations possessing interests to be represented in political voice. The 
other prioritises sectoral interests, class solidarity and unions in the life of any polity.  So each 
approach points to radically different approaches to regulating the role of money in politics 
generally.  But neither would draw the same boundaries around the concept of ‘foreign’ as the 
jurisdictional, or the political community approaches.  Thus the capitalist might defend the ability 
of an overseas industry to donate or campaign into an important potential market, if there was a 
debate about tariffs relevant to that industry in that market.   Conversely, a traditional socialist 
would defend the ability of sympathetic and connected left-wing movements and even 
governments to support each other across borders.  In either conception, there is no per se 
‘foreignness’.  Rather there are degrees of material connectedness. 
                                                             
10 The ‘tangible’ versus legal entity distinction is not mutually exclusive though.  Ships and aircraft for instance, may 
be caught by a jurisdiction either because of geographical location, or because of their registration with a port of 
(notional) origin.   
11 Elizabeth Frazer, ‘The Concept “Community”’ and ‘The Idea of a Political Community’, chs 2 and 7 of The Problem 
of Communitarian Politics: Unity and Conflict (OUP, 1999).  Not just amorphous, but the concept also risks underplaying 
the conflict, divergence and even contested boundaries that demark any modern polity:  Frazer at 244-5. 
12 Ibid, 241. 
13 Compare discussion of political community within federations in Colette Mintz, ‘From NFIB to Williams: A 
Principled Prohibition on Coercion for Australian Federalism’ (2018) 29 Public Law Review 47 at 56 and 59-61. 
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Rationales for Restricting Foreign Political Finance 
According to International IDEA, the rationale for bans on political contributions from foreign 
interests is to address concerns about ‘external/foreign influence’ to advance the ‘principle of self-
determination’.14  As early as 1974, US Senator Lloyd Bentsen summarised the rationale for 
prohibiting foreign donations in these terms:  
I do not think foreign nationals have any business in our political campaigns. They cannot vote in 
our elections so why should we allow them to finance our elections? Their loyalties lie elsewhere; 
they lie with their own countries and their own governments.15 
(Bentsen only mentioned ‘foreign nationals’ because he was speaking in the context of laws that 
already prohibited direct contributions from corporations or unions, wherever based, to US parties 
and candidates).   Unpacking this argument against foreign political donations reveals two elements 
to the rationale.  One is a positive claim, about who is included in the polity, namely US electors.  
The other is a negative claim, about the risk of inviting nefarious or at least competing overseas 
interests to influence US electoral politics.  Both claims are in a way chauvinist, but they reflect 
something deeply rooted in the concept of a self-governing, political community. 
These justifications for prohibiting ‘foreign’ political donations do not go unopposed.  An 
alternative position emerges from a cluster of arguments based in notions of freedom, tinged with 
internationalist liberalism.  On the freedom side is the libertarian principle that no particular 
viewpoint should be restrained, and that interests expressed through foreign funding of campaigns 
should not be suppressed.  Massaro has argued that this is the end point of the logic of the 
corporate-friendly US Supreme Court decision in the corporate-friendly campaign finance case, 
Citizens United.16  
Some, reasoning from a liberal economic perspective, go so far as to argue that foreign political 
donations are beneficial.  Thus Endoh claimed that they may encourage ‘Pareto efficient’ tariff 
policy.17  Powell reasoned that in a globally interdependent economy, arguments from national 
sovereignty not only hold less sway but that ‘foreign corporations have a significant interest in the 
domestic policies of other countries and thus may have a legitimate right to express those interests’, 
so that ‘instead of indiscriminately outlawing all donations from abroad’ regulation should focus 
only on explicit bribes.18  
Others, it must be noted, have shrugged their shoulders and wondered if regulation of such 
donations is more expressive than essential.  According to a Canadian study, foreign corporations 
are less likely to donate than locally-owned ones.19  If there are natural forces restraining the 
‘supply’ side of foreign donations, there may also be cultural factors restraining ‘demand’ for them.  
                                                             
14 Elin Falguera et al (eds), Funding of Political Parties and Election Campaigns: A Handbook on Political Finance (International 
IDEA, 2014) 21 
15 Contribution in 1974 Congressional debate, cited in Lori Fisler Damrosch, ‘Politics across Borders: Nonintervention 
and Nonforcible Influence over Domestic Affairs’ (1989) 83 American Journal of International Law 1, 23. 
16 Toni M Massaro, ‘Foreign Nationals, Corporate Spending and the First Amendment’ (2011) 34 Harvard Journal of 
Law and Public Policy 663. 
17 Masahiro Endoh, ‘Cross-Border Political Donations and Pareto Efficient Tariffs’ (2012) 21 The Journal of International 
Trade and Economic Development 493.  (Pareto-optimality is a kind of normative stability, representing a position where 
any change from that state would make some worse off without making others better off). 
18 Jeffrey K Powell, ‘Prohibitions on Campaign Contributions from Foreign Sources: Questioning their Justification 
in a Global Interdependent Economy’ (1996) 17 University of Pennsylvania International Economic Law Journal 957, 959–60. 
19 Joseph Wearing and Peter Wearing, ‘Mother’s Milk Revisited: The Effect of Foreign Ownership on Political 
Contributions’ (1990) 23 Canadian Journal of Political Science 115. 
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By the time the UK moved to prohibit foreign donations in 2000, Ewing notes, ‘the problem of 
foreign donors [had] largely disappeared’.20  By the late 1990s both UK major parties had adopted 
policies of not accepting foreign donations (although such voluntarism did not prevent the British 
Conservative Party being embroiled in a controversy over foreign sourced loans in 2006.21) 
Recently, Tham has typified ‘three different rationales’ for restricting foreign political money, by 
reference to three categories or definitions of ‘foreignness’:22   
1. foreign source (in the sense of drawing on resources based overseas),  
2. foreign government, and  
3. a broad status of foreign person or entity.    
 
The benefit of this approach is that it tethers the normative and theoretical question to concrete 
categories.  It does invite the chicken-and-egg question.  These categories are not rationales.  
Rather they are definitions which may imply clues as to sincere rationales for regulation, or which 
might be adopted for unprincipled (eg partisan, or rabble-rousing) motives.  Still, since the 
underlying concepts (foreignness, political community) are malleable, an inductive method that 
reasons outward from existing regulatory categories may be just as useful as any attempt to work 
deductively from broad, a priori principles. 
 
Foreign source prohibitions, Tham suggests, are principally anti-laundering devices, so that limits 
focused on local donors are not easily subverted by hard to trace roundabouts of money, from 
onshore to offshore and back onshore again.23  That may be a subsidiary purpose, but they also 
seek to serve as a form of restriction of substantively ‘foreign’ money.24  In doing so, a nuance is 
drawn that deflects accusations of xenophobia.  Foreignness becomes not a status of any person 
or entity, but more an attribute that weaves together the two alternatives to ‘political community’ 
discussed in the previous section.  One is the territorial conception of jurisdiction – wealth kept 
outside the jurisdiction should not bleed directly into it for political purposes.25  The other is the 
economic connectedness conception – resources that were not invested in or at least available to 
contribute to the local economy should not circulate in its political life. 
The second category is also relatively easy to frame, if imperfectly.  As we saw earlier, we have a 
substantive legal sense of what connotes a ‘foreign’ country.  Indeed the list of such entities is 
relatively fixed, even if it can be blurry in the case of evolving colonial or for that matter confederal 
relationships.26  In a liberal democracy, the state is meant to take no formal role in electioneering, 
                                                             
20 Keith D Ewing, The Cost of Democracy: Party Funding in Modern British Politics (Hart Publishing, 2007) 91. 
21 Ibid.  As a rule, loans on commercial terms are not regulated as ‘donations’.  However foreign loans, especially if 
from a government bank, may raise concerns similar to donations.  Canada Elections Act 2000 (Canada) s 373 permits 
parties/candidates to take loans only from Canadian registered banks or individuals, and only Canadian citizens or 
permanent residents can guarantee such loans. 
22 Joo-Cheong Tham, ‘Of Aliens, Money and Politics: Should Foreign Political Donations be Banned?’ (2017) 28 King’s 
Law Journal 262 at 265 and 268. 
23 Ibid, 265. 
24  In government, the Australian Labor Party sought to base a prohibition on such a definition, but its legislative 
proposal was blocked (for unrelated reasons) in the Senate. 
25 At this point the reader might see a paradox in the territorial jurisdiction approach:  what country can enforce its 
laws offshore?  That is a problem for enforcement but the legal response is to focus on incentives that attach to 
onshore entities and actors.  For example, fines and forfeitures for a party accepting offshore donations or rules 
restraining flows through local financial institutions. 
26 So ‘Europarties’ (operating at the EU level) are forbidden from taking donations from outside the EU – or from 
EU governments.  But they can take donations from persons or corporations across the EU.  See Wouter Wolfs and 
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and to take a neutral role in any funding of political parties or candidates.  Whether out of fear of 
the clout of foreign states, or a simple application of the principle of state-neutrality to foreign 
governments, then, it is unsurprising that prohibitions on foreign governmental activity in 
domestic elections are commonplace. 
The third and broader category of ‘foreigner’ is perhaps the most interesting as it forms a status 
attaching to people or entities.  Tham associates it with ‘understandings of political community’.  
Of course limits on ‘foreign’ sourced resources or ‘foreign’ governments are also rooted in an 
inclusionary/exclusionary notion, as is ‘political community’.  Nonetheless, the risk that crude 
xenophobia might drive regulation suggests we pay particular attention to prohibitions based on 
the status of people or entities.   
Further, whichever conception of political community drives the idea of ‘foreigner’, attempts to 
define that idea in legal terms strike a practical problem.  (A problem on an order of complexity 
higher than the relatively simple categories of foreign governments and states, and resources held 
offshore).  People may have multiple identities and residences.  As a result, the law often alights 
on immigration status as a proxy – most commonly citizenship, or permanent residency.  But even 
those simplifications cannot be applied to organisations.  Ships have national flags and 
corporations have a place of incorporation.  But a place of incorporation is a highly formal 
‘birthplace’, not a measure of substance; and in any event it is easy to multiply corporations and 
entities like associations and trusts may have no place of incorporation as such.  As a result, other 
looser but more substantive tests like ‘primary place of business’ must be invoked. 
Tham’s typology helpfully identifies the status of foreigner as in turn having three typical legal 
expressions.  These are ‘migrant status; the legal right to vote; and business connection’.27  The 
concept of ‘foreigner’, as we just noted, cannot be crudely essentialist. A person’s immigration 
status (not to mention their domicile) may evolve, just as the location of an organisation’s core 
activities may change.  Ultimately Tham’s mission is to argue, from a social democratic perspective, 
against a narrow definition of ‘foreigner’ that would exclude non-citizen permanent residents 
simply because they are typically denied the franchise.   
There is a cart and horse at work here:  at the level of the individual the right to vote is surely more 
fundamental than the ability to pour money into the political system.  The job of expanding the 
franchise beyond mere citizens seems more pressing than preserving the ability to influence politics 
in one’s country of residency through money.   A person who resides lawfully in a political 
community or polity is a political animal, possessing an interest in political expression and equality 
of concern, however poorly or well-resourced they are. After all, as we have seen, even in its thin 
conception the political community encompasses those who are subjected to the same system of 
government.   
A corporation however, at heart, is a collection of resources.  So it makes sense to restrict 
corporations from using overseas based assets to influence local politics, and to demand some 
minimum level of onshore business commitment or operations (and hence interests to defend) 
before wielding such influence on the same basis as indigenous organisations.28   
 
                                                             
Jef Smulders, ‘Party Finance at the Level of the European Union’ in Jonathan Mendilow and Eric Phélippeau, 
Handbook of Political Party Funding (Edward Elgar, 2018) 183 at 192-3. 
27 Tham, above n 21, 266. 
28  Say be having a local incorporated entity and business activity to draw on. 
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Comparative Political Finance Law 
The table in the appendix summarises the regulation of foreign political donations, at national 
level, in five common law democracies. In alphabetical order these are Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand, the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US).  This is not to ignore the 
importance of other systems, but to permit comparison from a shared basis of common law, liberal 
democracies and economies, with relatively stable party and largely majoritarian party and electoral 
systems.29  The regulatory measures adopt elements of all the conceptions we identified earlier:  
jurisdiction, political community especially (whether thick or thin), and material 
interconnectedness (especially economic interrelationships).  Absent is any purely laissez-faire 
regime, although that was the prevailing approach in all systems until recent decades.   
US law was the first to act in the field of restricting ‘foreign’ political finance.30  Since 1966 it has 
‘attempt[ed] to minimize foreign intervention in US elections [through a] series of limitations on 
foreign nationals [including] general prohibition on political contributions by foreign nationals’.31 
The US Code thus prohibits foreign nationals making ‘contributions and donations’ or 
electioneering expenditure. 32  The term ‘foreign national’ in turn leverages a compendious 
definition of ‘foreign principal’.33  These restrictions were held to be constitutional in Bluman v 
FEC (2011), despite the otherwise laissez-faire nature of the first amendment and the relaxation 
of the ability of corporations to directly electioneer in Citizens United (2010).   
Canada, like the US, bans organisational (especially corporate or union) donations to parties or 
candidates in general.  So it shares with the US a rule that only citizens or permanent residents 
should donate to parties or candidates. But, unlike the US – and more akin to the UK and New 
Zealand – it also restrains election expenditures.  Any sizeable third party campaign must be 
mounted by a citizen or resident group, or corporation ‘carrying on business’ in Canada.34  Such 
third party campaigns are themselves faced with a list of prohibited donors (notably overseas 
governments, or unions or corporations that do not carry on business in Canada). 
The UK defines ‘permissible source’ donors - and campaigners - by reference to a variety of 
statuses.35  In particular, corporate donors have to be registered in the UK and carrying on business 
there.  New Zealand caps donations, and electioneering, by ‘overseas persons’, including bodies 
incorporated abroad.  The donation cap in New Zealand however suffers from a loophole: as a 
foreign person or entity could give NZ$1500 to every candidate of a favoured party, and indeed 
donations under the limit are not disclosable. 
The regimes proposed in Australia go further than elsewhere in several key respects.  Recall there 
have been two proposals.  The former Labor government wanted to ban foreign sourced money.  
This as we noted earlier embodies the territorial jurisdiction conception of foreignness.  The 
                                                             
29 In voting systems, New Zealand is the odd-one out with its move in 1992 to a proportional representation in its 
house of government.  Whilst leading to coalition governments, that move has not upended the two-party dynamic 
as governments still alternate between cabinets dominated by one or other of the two traditional parties. 
30 Just as it was the first to act in restricting donations generally, with the Tillman Act (1907) ban on direct corporate 
contributions to candidates. On the other hand, the UK was the first to tackle election expenditure, beginning with 
candidates in the 1880s.  Modern attempts to regulate political finance holistically however are a product of relatively 
recent decades. 
31 Federal Election Commission (US), ‘Foreign Nationals’ (23/6/2017) <https://www.fec.gov/updates/foreign-
nationals/> (accessed 17/6/2018). 
32  52 USC §30121. 
33  22 USC §611(b). 
34 ‘Third party’ is jargon for political actors besides parties and candidates, such as lobby groups. 
35 Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 (UK) s 54. 
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current Australian conservative government’s proposal, summarised in the table below, is more 
involved.  
Under it, one notable feature is the precariousness of any right for permanent residents to 
contribute financially.  A mere Regulation could exclude their ability to donate.36  This would 
reflect a rather thin conception of ‘political community’: citizens first, others are ‘foreign’.  It would 
also be odd for such a basic political interest to be subject to ministerial whim rather than statutory 
definition.  A thicker conception of national versus foreign political community is found elsewhere.  
Thus, US green-card holders are explicitly entitled to donate on a par with citizens.37  Canada 
similarly treats permanent residents on a par with citizens, in terms of a right to participate through 
both donations and direct campaigning.38   Whilst New Zealand and UK law ostensibly requires 
individual donors to be electors, permanent residents are able to vote in New Zealand,39 as can 
Commonwealth and Irish citizens resident in the UK.40 
The current Australian proposal is also unusual in extending beyond electioneering, to political 
campaigning more generally.  That is, it seeks to limit the ability of locally-based third parties, like 
lobby groups and charities, from sourcing funds overseas if those funds might find their way into 
an advocacy campaign within Australia.  This equates political campaigning within civil society 
with political party activity, and seek to purge any foreign money from either domain.  Comparable 
democracies do not go that far. They see the point of regulation more narrowly, to prevent foreign 
money tainting parties and candidates directly or indirectly by touching on formal election 
campaigns.  The breadth of the Australian proposal is also remarkable since that nation’s political 
finance system is otherwise light touch.  At national level, Australia has no limits on donations to 
parties/candidates nor electoral expenditure.41 
Noticeably, all the jurisdictions would preserve an equal right for expatriates – citizens abroad – 
to donate.  This is regardless of how long they had been expatriated.   For systems where 
expatriates retain the right to vote in perpetuity (US) or for a long period (UK, 15 years) this seems 
logical, if not essential.  It makes less sense in nations where expatriates lose their voting rights 
after a modest period, such as Canada (currently 5 years)42 or Australia (6 years unless there is an 
actual intention to return).  In either case, we see an extended idea of ‘political community’ 
embedded in the notion of citizenship.  However in the latter countries the suturing of voting 
rights reflects a belief that at some point an expatriate citizen drifts away from their homeland to 
the point of not deserving a formal electoral voice.  It might then be asked: on what basis should 
their ability to financially influence their original homeland’s politics be preserved? 
                                                             
36 Electoral Legislation Amendment (Electoral Funding and Disclosure) Bill 2017-18, cl 9(2) (proposed new 
Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Australia) s 287AA(2)). Subject to constitutional arguments.  In 2015 the Australian 
High Court disapproved of a limitation of (capped) donations in state politics to electors, reasoning that politics was 
not just about the individual interests of citizens, but included persons and entities affected by government – such as 
organisations and permanent residents: Unions NSW v New South Wales (2013) 252 CLR 530 at 551. 
37 52 USC §30121(b)(2). 
38 Canada Elections Act 2000 (Canada) ss 331(b) and 363(b). 
39 Electoral Act 1993 (NZ) s 74(1)(a).  The right is temporarily lost if the permanent resident spends a year abroad: s 
80(1)(b). 
40  Representation of the People Act 1983 (UK) s 1(1). Citizens of EU nations can also vote in UK local and European 
Parliament elections:  Representation of the People Act 1983 s 2(1) and European Parliamentary Elections Act 2002 s 8(5) but 
not UK parliamentary elections. 
41 See further Graeme Orr, ‘Party Finance Law in Australia:  Innovation and Enervation’ (2016) 15 Election Law Journal 
58. 
42 Subject to a pending Supreme Court appeal, from a decision upholding the 5 year rule, Frank v A-G (Canada) [2015] 
ONCA 536. 
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When it comes to organisations, all the countries surveyed seek to prohibit foreign governments 
– and political parties – from contributing.  This suggests a rejection of any older idea of (socialist) 
solidarity across borders.  However when it comes to non-government organisations, especially 
economic actors such as businesses, the position is nuanced.  In the countries surveyed, some mix 
of jurisdiction, and economic interconnectedness, prevails.  The jurisdiction side is reflected in 
rights for bodies formally incorporated within the country, and barriers to foreign governments 
and states (ie rival jurisdictions).  The economic interconnectedness element is reflected in 
requirements that a corporation have a place of business in the country.43 
For instance, a body incorporated in New Zealand is not an ‘overseas person’ and can donate to 
parties or promote an election time campaign there.  In the UK, an organisation must be registered 
in the UK or the EU (the UK being extended, economically, into the EU) and ‘carry on business’ 
in the UK.  Incorporation in Australia, or having a principal place of business there, will suffice.  
The US similarly.  In Canada economic connectedness is sufficient, as long as the corporation 
carries on business there.  
It is also noticeable that in federal systems, the legal expression of ‘foreignness’ rarely applies 
between sub-national states or provinces.  This strongly suggests a nationalistic conception of 
‘political community’, and possibly a sense of intense material interconnectedness between such 
states or provinces.  Otherwise, such sub-national entities are themselves political communities, 
and are essentially autonomous jurisdictions for the purposes of regulating their own elections in 
particular.44  The issue is particularly piquant where referendums on devolution or independence 
are involved. ‘Foreign’ influence through both direct campaigning and campaign finance, 
emanating from other parts of the UK, was an issue in the Scottish independence referendum.  
But it was left to flow.45  In contrast, the Referendums Act of Québec limits contributions to 
money from political parties or electors of that province.46   This has the happy (for separatists) 
effect of staunching the influence of pro-federation money from within the rest of Canada. 
A final, if formal, point is that some jurisdictions define foreignness head-on, in the sense of having 
a list of prohibited donors.  That is the case for the US and New Zealand.  The UK and the 
Australian proposal indirectly defines the concept, through an inclusive list of allowable or 
permissible donors.  The indirect approach may seem cleaner:  it gives political parties and 
candidates a checklist, requiring them to ensure donors fall within that list.47 But, as an Australian 
parliamentary committee reasoned, the liberty interest may call for a spelling out of – and hence 
                                                             
43 Perhaps illustrating the decline of socialism, there is no equivalent for internationalist unions to participate in any 
of the countries. 
44 This has long been the case in Australia, the US and Canada, and has become the case for the devolved parts of the 
UK (Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland).  True, federal systems often have constitutional rules to protect one 
region from discriminating against residents of other regions. But such rules do not apply to matters inherent to 
regional institutional autonomy or political representation such as rights to vote (and by extension related electoral 
rights). See eg Street v Queensland Bar Association (1989) 168 CLR 461 at 512-4, 528 and 548. 
45 Scottish Independence Referendum Act 2013 (Scotland) s 11 and Sch 4, cl 2 (‘permissible donor’ included electors and 
entities across the UK).  This was in line with the general referendum finance law in the UK, see the Political Parties, 
Referendums and Electoral Act 2000 (UK) s 119 and Sch 15.  In contrast, at the Brexit referendum, EU nationals resident 
in the UK could not contribute as they did not have the requisite voting rights; yet EU companies could contribute if 
they had a UK registered presence. 
46 Referendum Act 1978 (Québec) chapter C-64.1, ss 37-38.   (In addition, Québec government money subsidises both 
‘yes’ and ‘no’ cases). 
47 Eg, The Electoral Commission (UK), Permissibility Checks for Political Parties. 
<http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0015/102282/sp-permissibility-rp.pdf> 
(accessed 10/6/2018). 
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justification of – an explicit list of prohibited donors.48  (Canada employs both approaches.  It has 
a list of allowable donors to parties, and of who can electioneer; but in terms of who can contribute 
to third party campaigns, there is a list of prohibited donors). Regardless of approach, none of the 
five countries purport to permit foreign governments or political parties to contribute. 
Reciprocity: A Blindspot 
Before concluding, it is worth noting the curious absence of the principle of reciprocity from both 
existing regulations and the ongoing debate.  Earlier we noted the fact that in ordinary 
understanding, ‘foreign’ is a reflexive relationship.  To identify some set of others as ‘foreign’ is, 
logically, to identify oneself as ‘foreign’ to them.      
Yet regulation of the international activities of domestic entities tends to only focus on 
implementing international conventions against outright bribery and graft.  Bribing of public 
officials has long been criminalised at a domestic level;49 an international push against its offshore 
manifestations resulted in the 1998 OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials). 50  
Countries that ban foreign donations into their own political system do not seem concerned to 
stem any flow of political money from their own corporations or citizens into overseas polities. 
Similarly hypocritical is the instinct to fear inward, foreign governmental influence most of all, 
whilst maintaining outgoing aid programmes tied to particular political and economic outcomes.51  
This oversight is not necessarily evidence that the debate is xenophobic; it may simply suggest that 
domestic debates are driven by perceptions of self-interest.  It may also reflect the fact that some 
cultures care less about foreign political activity or donations.  What is telling is that the high 
principle of prohibiting foreign influence is typically seen as a one-way street. 
This blindspot is also curious given the difficulty of enforcement of laws extra-territorially.  
Penalties preventing say Australian corporations from donating into foreign political systems 
would be more susceptible of enforcement, at the source of the gift, than laws against foreign 
donors.  This is particularly the case given the answerability of those firms to local corporate 
regulators.  Recognising this difficulty of enforcement at the source of the donor, laws against 
foreign donations instead target recipients such as local political parties.   
 
Conclusion (tbc) 
 
 
                                                             
48 Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, Advisory Report on the Electoral Legislation Amendment (Electoral Funding 
and Disclosure) Bill 2017 (Parliament of Australia, April 2018) 45-6. 
49 See, eg, the Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act 1889 (UK) and note the exclusion of overseas public bodies/officials in 
s 7. 
50 Which spawned the International Bribery Act 1998 strengthening the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 1977 (US): Trevor 
Potter and Paul S Ryan, ‘United States’ in Grant (ed), above n 1, 581–2.  For the UK see the Bribery Act 2010 (UK) s 
6. For Canada see Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act 1998 (Canada).  For Australia see Criminal Code Act 1995 
(Australia) Div 70 and Simon Bronitt, ‘Policing Corruption and Corporations in Australia: Towards a New National 
Agenda’ (2013) 37 Criminal Law Journal 283, 287-9.   
51 At a minimum, as Magnus Ohman notes in ‘Africa’ in Falguera et al (eds), above n 12, 38 at 41, ‘[h]ow foreign aid 
is structured [may] have a significant impact on the dynamics of political finance’ since parties and businesses will 
adjust their behaviours and even structures to access donor assistance. 
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Table:  Summary of Comparative Regulation 
National System General scheme What is ‘foreign’ 
Australia Relatively light regulation. 
 
Annual disclosure, but no caps on 
donations or expenditure. 
 
Proposed bill would limit contributions over A$250pa to 
‘allowable donors’: 
• electors or citizens abroad 
• entities incorporated in, or with head office or 
principal place of activity in, Australia. 
Foreign bodies politic or public enterprises are excluded.  
Permanent residents could be excluded by ministerial fiat. 
 
The prohibition would extend beyond parties and 
candidates, to cover third parties that engage in political 
advocacy campaigns. 
 
Canada 
 
 
 
Comprehensive regulation 
 
Caps on donations + election period 
expenditure (including third party 
electioneering) 
 
Election period limited to formal 
campaign period. 
Issue advertising is covered. 
 
 
 
Donors to parties/candidates must be citizens or permanent 
residents.   Anyone outside that group also commits an 
offence if they seek to ‘in any way induce electors’ to vote or 
not vote, at all or in a particular way. 
 
Third party election spending over $500 limited to: 
• Citizen or resident (or group run by such) 
• Corporation carrying on business in Canada 
Third party election advertising must not be funded from: 
• Non-citizen or non-permanent resident 
• Corporation not carrying on business in Canada 
• Trade union lacking bargaining rights in Canada 
• Foreign political party 
• Foreign government or agent. 
 
New Zealand 
 
 
 
Caps on election advertising 
expenditure in regulated period.   No 
general donation caps. Broadcasting 
limited to parties’ government funded 
air-time, or 3rd parties. 
 
Third parties can only broadcast pure 
issue advertising. 
 
The regulated period for expenditure 
caps is 3 months (or less if a snap poll) 
 
‘Overseas person’ defined as: 
• Individual who resides outside NZ and is not a NZ 
citizen or elector, or  
• Body incorporated outside NZ, or 
• Unincorporated body with principal place of business 
outside NZ. 
Party or candidate limited to NZ$1500 from any ‘overseas 
person’ per 3 year cycle. 
 
‘Overseas person’ cannot register to be 3rd party ‘promoter’.  
Registered 3rd parties also limited to NZ$308 000 election 
expenditure. Unregistered promoter (including ‘overseas 
person’) limited to NZ$12 600 per election. 
 
United Kingdom 
 
Caps on election expenditure.  But no 
general donation caps.  Only parties 
may broadcast political ads, and then via 
free airtime. 
 
For 3rd parties, ‘regulated campaign 
activity’ is activity reasonably regarded 
as intended to influence voters. 
 
Exclusive list of ‘permissible sources’: 
• Elector (which includes UK citizens overseas, and 
many Commonwealth and EU citizens resident in UK) 
• UK registered company or partnership or 
unincorporated association, carrying on business there 
• UK registered trade union, building or friendly society 
• Certain trusts or public funds 
• Not charities 
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The ‘controlled period’ limiting 
expenditure is 1 year prior to election. 
 
United States of 
America 
 
 
Caps on donations, but no expenditure 
caps. 
 
 
There is a general ban on direct contributions to parties or 
candidates from corporations or unions. 
 
‘Foreign nationals’ may not make, directly or indirectly: 1. 
‘contribution .. in connection with … election …for purpose 
of influencing … election’, nor 2. ‘expenditure … for 
electioneering communication’.  
 
‘Foreign national’ is: 
• Foreign government or political party 
• Entity or group organized under foreign law or with its 
principal place of business in foreign country 
• Individuals who are not citizens nor admitted for 
permanent residence. 
(Domestic subsidiaries of foreign corporations also face limits 
if the foreign corporation finances that activity.) 
 
 
